Collective Bargaining by University and College Faculties Under the National Labor Relations Act by Sharpe, Daniel R.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY UNIVERSITY
AND COLLEGE FACULTIES UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Wagner Act' in 1935, Congress made
its first attempt to regulate labor relations on the federal level. The
newly created National Labor Relations Board 2 was given broad
authority over employers and employees whose relations "affected
commerce." 3 Until recently, however, the Board generally declined
to assert jurisdiction over colleges and universities on the broad
ground that to assert jurisdiction would not "effectuate the policies
of the Act."4 This paper will focus on the recent change in policy and
the new problems it has presented to the Board.
II. BOARD ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION
A. Statutory Basis and Pre-1970 Policies
From the early days of the Wagner Act, it was established that
the jurisdictional grant to the Board over questions of representation
and unfair labor practices affecting commerce was coextensive with
Congress' plenary power under the commerce clause.5 The Act also
broadly defines "employer" and "employee"' in such a way as to
include colleges and universities as employers (except where they may
be considered a "political subdivision" of a state) and faculty mem-
bers as employees. 7 Prior to 1950, the Board used a "commerciality"
49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 29 U.S.C. §§141 et seq. (1970).
Hereinafter referred to as the "NLRB" or the "Board".
3 Labor-Management Relations Act §2(7), 29 U.S.C. §152(7) (1970) [hereinafter cited as
"LMRA" or the "Act"] states:
The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or obstruct-
ing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a
labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.
Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 427 (1951).
See NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
LMRA §2(2), 29 U.S.C. §152(2) (1970) states:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation . . . .or any State or political subdivision thereof. ...
LMRA §2(3), 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1970) states:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer. . . .but shall not include . ..any individ-
ual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor. . ..
7 While there may be some argument that faculty members are all supervisors or indepen-
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 36
test to determine whether or not it would assert jurisdiction over
eleemosynary, nonprofit employers.8 This test looked toward the
employer's activities rather than to the motive for the activities. Ac-
tivities that were primarily engaged in "trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication"9 were within the scope of this test.
Thus the Board asserted jurisdiction in cases involving professional
and fraternal organizations, electrical cooperatives, and church-
operated publishing houses. 10
In 1951 in the case of Trustees of Columbia University," the
Board declared that it would not "assert its jurisdiction over a non-
profit, educational institution where the activities involved are non-
commercial in nature and intimately connected with the charitable
purposes and educational activities of the institution. 12 Although
there may be some question as to whether or not the Board correctly
relied on the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, 13 that case
provided a precedent for denying jurisdiction in later cases involving
dent contractors, these have been summarily disposed of by the Board. The point here made is
that the Act's definition of "employee" is broad enough to include, generally, faculty members
although some individuals might be excluded as supervisors or independent contractors. Most
faculty members do not individually supervise or have authority over other employees, and
most universities maintain sufficient control over the teaching process to negate the argument
that faculty members have an independent contractor status.
8 For example, in Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 44 N.L.R.B. 533, 540 (1942),
enforced, 145 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945), the Board, in
asserting its jurisdiction, noted the commercial nature of the employer's business: "[Tihe
activities of the Hospital, even if they should be regarded as non-profit-making, are within reach
of the power of Congress and the terms used by it in conferring jurisdiction on the Board."
LMRA §2(6), 29 U.S.C. §152(6) (1970) (defining "commerce").
1o See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n., 39 N.L.R.B. 385 (1942); Salt River Valley Water
Users Ass'n., 32 N.L.R.B. 460 (1941); Christian Bd. of Publication, 13 N.L.R.B. 534 (1939),
enforced, 113 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1940).
" 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
9 Id. at 427.
See Schramm, Effects of NLRB Jurisdictional Change on Union Organizing in Private
Colleges and Universities, 23 LAB. L.J. 572 (1972); Comment, NLRB Jurisdiction Over Private
Colleges and Universities-Toward Elimination of the Good Works Exclusion, 44 TEmP. L.Q.
410 (1971).
The Congressional Conference Committee deleted specific exemptions from the coverage
of the Act that had been present in the House Bill. The House exemptions included, in part,
organizations "operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes. . . ." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. §2 (1947). The Conference Committee acted
under the mistaken impression that prior Board rulings had held that such organizations were
not within the scope of the Act because they did not sufficiently affect commerce:
[N]on profit organizations excluded under the House bill are not specifically ex-
cluded in the conference agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances and in
connection with purely commercial activities of such organizations have any of the
activities of such organizations or of their employees been considered as affecting
commerce so as to bring them within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act.
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947).
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the noncommercial activities of nonprofit organizations. 4 Despite the
Supreme Court's approval of the Board's discretionary denial of ju-
risdiction, 5 Congress gave statutory authority to this discretionary
action by the Board in its 1959 amendments to the LMRA."
Thus it was clear until 1970 that the Board did not lack statutory
authority to assert jurisdiction over private colleges and universities.
The Board's position up to that time reflected a policy favoring the
exclusion of nonprofit institutions from federal labor regulation, per-
haps as a benefit in exchange for providing essential services for the
community. 7
B. The Cornell University Decision"
By 1970 the tide had turned, and the Board was ready to reverse
its previous categorical refusal to assert jurisdiction over educational
institutions. Not only did the Board have the statutory authority to
assert its jurisdiction, but the factors which led to the previous discre-
tionary denial were no longer present. The activities of many universi-
ties extended into the commercial and social life of the communities
' See, e.g., Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, 109 N.L.R.B. 859 (1954); Armour Re-
search Foundation, 107 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1954); Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n., 97 N.L.R.B. 548
(1951). The Columbia rule was not without its difficulties of application. For example, in
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 143 N.L.R.B. 568, 569 (1963), the Board exercised
jurisdiction over a private, nonprofit organization engaged in marine research "for its own sake
without thought of specific, practical application" and in the teaching of oceanography. On the
other hand, in Crotty Bros., New York, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 755 (1964), the Board relied on
the Columbia case in declining jurisdiction over a food service operated at a private, nonprofit
college by a profitmaking corporation. See also Massachusetts Institute of Tech., 110 N.L.R.B.
1611 (1954) (jurisdiction asserted).
,1 Office Employees Int'l. Union, Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
1 LMRA §14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. 164(c)(1) (1970), amending, LMRA §14, states:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the
opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, that the Board shall
not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert
jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
17 To the extent that employees are paid less when not represented by a collective bargain-
ing agent, the employer benefits from cheaper labor.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organ-
ized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association. . . tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates. . ..
LMRA §1, 29 U.S.C. §151 (1970) (emphasis added). Denial of employees' rights to organize
and refusal of employers to bargain collectively, however, "lead to strikes and other forms of
industrial strife or unrest. . . "Id.
IS Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
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around them. Campus disorder in the 1960's was viewed not as a local
university problem, but as a national issue. Finally, the Board could
no longer cite misguided Congressional reports as expressing a legis-
lative intent to keep its "hands off" university labor problems. To the
contrary, the Board interpreted section 14(c) of the Act as manifest-
ing a Congressional policy favoring Board assertion of jurisdiction
where the operations of the employers in question have a substantial
impact on commerce."
The Board noted the broad scope of operations of private col-
leges and universities, such as Cornell and Syracuse, which were
directly involved in the case, and their huge operating budgets and
payrolls, Federal grants, construction projects and out-of-state stu-
dents. Increased Federal involvement in the activities of higher educa-
tion seemed to indicate that employees in higher education should be
accorded the same rights and protections as employees in the profit-
making sector.20 Furthermore, the failure of the states to enact legis-
lation in the area of labor relations left most nonprofit universities
and their employees without the benefit and protection of statutory
public policy and procedure. 21
In a unanimous decision the Board decided to assert jurisdiction
over Cornell and Syracuse Universities and to overrule its previous
decision in the Columbia case.22 In so doing, the Board opened the
door to a new era in campus labor relations. Although the Board's
discussion in Cornell was limited to private colleges and universi-
ties,23 increased pressure in Congress and in the various state legisla-
tui:es would logically mount to apply the same rules to the larger and
growing state universities either on the federal level or through state
laws.24
"1 183 N.L.R.B. at 332. The converse implication of §14(c)(l) is a confirmation of the
Board's authority to expand its jurisdiction to any class of employers whose operations substan-
tially affect commerce. While the statute does not compel such an expansion of jurisdiction,
the Board felt that Congress intended such a result.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 331-32. At the time of the Cornell decision, a total of fifteen states had enacted
labor-management legislation. Id. at 333. Since that time six more states have enacted such
legislation, making the total twenty-one. CHRONICLE HIGHER ED., June 10, 1974, at 6, col. I.
22 183 N.L.R.B. at 334. The decision is discussed in 35 NLRB ANN. RaP. 26(1970).
21 183 N.L.R.B. at 334.
24 The Board does not have jurisdiction over "political subdivisions" of states. LMRA
§2(2), 29 U.S.C. §152(2)(1970). Thus, if state universities are indeed political subdivisions of
states, Board jurisdiction can only be achieved through amendment of the statute. Given
favorable circumstances, (such as privately appointed or publicly elected directors or substan-
tial governing autonomy), an argument might be made in a specific case that a state university
is not a political subdivision of a state. Any such argument, however, would not encounter easy
sailing.
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C. Present Board Policy and Jurisdictional Standards
In its historic decision in Cornell, the Board made it clear that
it intended to adopt dollar-volume jurisdictional standards, similar to
the standards applied in other contexts of the Board's jurisdiction. 2
Because Cornell and Syracuse were two of the largest private univers-
ities, the Cornell case did not present a good opportunity for the
Board to develop the proper minimum standards in this context. The
question, therefore, was left open for further adjudication.
In another historic move, the Board decided to utilize its rule-
making power to determine the jurisdictional standards applicable to
private colleges and universities. 6 Only thirty-two days after the deci-
sion in Cornell, the NLRB's Notice of Proposed Rule Making ap-
peared in the Federal Register.2Y The notice contained no proposed
standard, but merely requested interested parties to submit their
views and arguments on the subject. Perhaps the Board felt that in
stepping into such a complex sector of interstate commerce it ought
first consult the potential contestants before charging full tilt into the
fray.
Pursuant to a notice published on December 3, 1970, the Board
adopted the following standard:
The Board will assert jurisdiction in any proceeding arising
under sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Act involving any private nonprofit
college or university which has a gross annual revenue from all
sources (excluding only contributions which, because of limitation
by the grantor, are not available for use for operating expenses) of
not less than $1 million."
By the Board's own estimate, based on data submitted by parties
responding to the Board's rulemaking notice, this standard "would
bring some eighty percent of all private colleges and universities and
183 N.L.R.B. at 334.
26 Section 6 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §156 (1970), grants the NLRB the authority to "make,
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." The
Administrative Procedure Act can be found at 5 U.S.C. §§551 et seq.(1970). The Board's action
was historic because, while it had the power to make rules under the Administrative Procedure
Act since 1947, this was the first time it used those procedures to make rules. See Note, The
NLRB's Assertion of Jurisdiction Over Universities, 32 U. PITT. L. REv. 416,423 (1971). For
a more complete discussion of the NLRB's activity in rule-making see Bernstein, The NLRB's
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J.
571 (1970).
2 35 Fed. Reg. 11270 (1970). The proposal appeared on July 14, 1970.
- 29 C.F.R. §103.1 (1974). The rule was originally published in 35 Fed. Reg. 18370 (1970),
and may also be found in NLRB, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE
§103.1 (1973).
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approximately ninety-five percent of all full and part-time nonprofes-
sional personnel within the reach of the Act. '29
While the adopted standard was amenable to a fairly mechanical
application, it may have appeared that the Board had not yet decided
whether or not the professionals, i.e. the faculty, at the university
were to be considered employees within the Act. The question soon
arose and the Board, in a unanimous decision, summarily dismissed
an employer's argument that its professional teaching staffs were not
employees within the meaning of the Act." This case marked the
first time the Board extended the NLRA's protections to faculty
members at a university.
The path was then finally cleared for full faculty participation
in collective bargaining, at least where the college was a private one
and met the Board's $1 million revenue standard. There has been no
major court challenge to this newly developed posture by the NLRB,
although such a challenge is reported to be forthcoming.31 Went-
worth College of Technology, which received an order to bargain
with the representative of its faculty, 32 will apparently remain stead-
fast in its refusal to bargain in order to force a court decision. 3
Wentworth's challenge will most likely be based on two grounds: (1)
that the college is not engaged in commerce under the meaning of the
LMRA, and (2) that the faculty members are not employees within
the Act. The first point would seem to be settled against the college's
contention, 34 but the second may raise some difficult questions re-
garding who is a "supervisor" under the Act. This question will be
discussed in the next section.
III. SCOPE OF BOARD JURISDICTION
A. Appropriate Units
Probably the most difficult problem that faces the Board in the
21 35 Fed. Reg. 18371 (1970).
m C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
31 CHRONICLE HIGHER ED., May 13, 1974, at 1, col. 4. Previously a United States district
court dismissed an action by New York University that sought to enjoin a Board-ordered
election among its faculty. New York Univ. v. NLRB, 364 F.Supp. 160 (1973). The case was
dismissed on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction, and thus the merits were not reached.
Since collective bargaining was rejected in the Board election that followed, the matter was
never pursued.
32 210 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 86 L.R.R.M. 1462 (1974) [here and in other cases where the
NLRB official reports have not been formally published, parallel citations will be given to
L.R.R.M.].
3 In order to enforce its orders the Board must apply to a United States court of appeals.
See §10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(e)(1970).
" See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (giving an expansive reading to the
commerce clause in the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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area of collective bargaining by college faculties is the question of the
appropriate unit. The Act gives no real guidance on this problem,
35
and therefore the Board must rely on its past rulings and the individ-
ual circumstances of each case as viewed in the light of Board policy.
The Board has stated:
In performing this function [unit determination], the Board
must maintain the two-fold objective of insuring to employees their
rights to self-organization and freedom of choice in collective bar-
gaining and of fostering industrial peace and stability through
collective bargaining. In determining the appropriate unit, the
Board delineates the grouping of employees within which freedom
of choice may be given collective expression. At the same time it
creates the context within which the process of collective bargaining
must function. Because the scope of the unit is basic to and per-
meates the whole of the collective-bargaining relationship, each unit
determination, in order to further effective expression of the statu-
tory purposes, must have a direct relevancy to the circumstances
within which collective bargaining is to take place. For, if the unit
determination fails to relate to the factual situation with which the
parties must deal, efficient and stable collective bargaining is under-
mined rather than fostered.3
1. C. W. Post and Early Rulings
The first case in which the Board was called upon to make unit
determinations with respect to university teaching staffs was C. W.
Post Center of Long Island University.37 In finding an appropriate
unit comprised of full and part-time faculty members, librarians,
research associates, and guidance counselors, the Board ruled on
several novel and primary issues. The employer first contended that
all the faculty must be "supervisors" since the university's rules al-
lowed full-time faculty members to participate in certain policy deci-
sions and in the selection, promotion, and retention of faculty mem-
bers.38 Such rules must be considered usual at a university where
5 Section 9(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §159(b)(1970) states:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, that the Board shall not (1) decide
that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional
employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of
such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit . ...
11 Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1962).
37 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
3' Supervisors are defined in §2(1 1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §152(11) (1970), as:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, trans-
fer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
1975]
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until recently university government has been viewed as a cooperative
effort on the part of the administration, faculty, and even the stu-
dents. The Board rejected the employer's contention, however, and
stated:
Mindful that we are to some extent entering into an
unchartered [sic] area, we are of the view that the policymaking and
quasi-supervisory authority which adheres to full-time faculty status
but is exercised by them only as a group does not make them
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act, or man-
agerial employees who must be separately represented."
The Board next rejected the employer's contention that because
of the unique attributes of faculty bargaining, special rules and differ-
ent principles must be adopted in making unit determinations. The
Board decided that the ordinary unit determination rules will apply
in these situations, stating:
[W]e are not persuaded that such principles will prove to be less
reliable guides to stable collective bargaining in this field than they
have proven to be in others .... 4o
Later in the same year the Board denied a petition from the
American Association of University Professors which requested the
Board to engage in rule making procedures to set up broad general
rules for faculty collective bargaining, or to learn about the range of
problems even if it did not promulgate rules." The Board said in its
denial:
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of indepen-
dent judgment.
"1 189 N.L.R.B. at 905.
40 Id.
"1 The AAUP's petition, which was drafted by Professor Clyde Summers of Yale Law
School and Professor Merton C. Bernstein of The Ohio State University College of Law,
presented a compelling case for rule making in this situation:
[The Board] must [apply the Act] with no substantial guides drawn from experi-
ence with these institutions, and only with guides drawn from settings which may be
unsuited for the special character of institutions of higher education. The problems
confronted by the Board are particularly acute in representation cases because of the
Board's broad range of discretion in representation cases and its heavy responsibility
for tailoring bargaining units appropriate for the institutional framework.
The problem confronted by the Board has its source in the uniqueness of the
relationship between faculty members and the college or university. This uniqueness
has no counterpart in any industrial setting with which the Board has substantial
experience and is an integral part of deeply rooted traditions of academic institutions.
AAUP Petition to NLRB for Proceedings for Rule-Making in Representation Cases Involving
Faculty Members in Colleges and Universities, June 18, 1971, at 2 [hereinafter cited as AAUP
Petition].
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[T]o adopt inflexible rules for units of teaching employees at
this time might well introduce too great an element of rigidity and
prevent the board from adapting its approach to a highly pluralistic
and fluid set of conditions."
Thus the Board had opted for a case-by-case development of the
issues. Although this method has been marked by miscalculations,
mistakes, and reversals, some of which will be noted below, perhaps
the Board will yet be able to develop policies that will make sense
when applied to the increasing demands of faculties for collective
bargaining. 3
2. Department Chairmen
The most notable exclusions from the unit at C. W. Post were
the department chairmen. They were usually considered supervisors
because of their effective voice in the hiring of new faculty members
and in the changing of status of present faculty members. The chair-
men also had an active part in resolving faculty grievances. The
question whether department chairmen are supervisors is one that
arises in practically every faculty unit determination made by the
Board.
In Rosary Hill College,44 the Board held that it would not gener-
ally consider department heads to be supervisors. This conclusion was
reached on the basis of the Board's experience in previous university
cases and on the wide fluctuation found in the responsibilities given
to department chairmen at different institutions.
[W]e see no reason at this time for departing from our usual
practice of requiring an affirmative showing that the disputed fac-
ulty department heads have been given one or more of the indicia
of supervisory authority set forth in Section 2(11) or that their
recommendations affecting personnel status are relied on and gener-
ally followed. 5
This ruling came after several cases where department chairmen
were included in faculty bargaining units, generally on the grounds
that their power was advisory only, that their advice was given only
42 CHRONICLE HIGHER ED., Aug. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
13 The AAUP may have more correctly foreseen future problems when it stated:
Proceeding on a case-by-case basis, limiting each decision to the special facts of each
case, will reduce the risk of premature generalization; but some guides or standards
must be enunciated if confusion is to be avoided.
AAUP Petition, at 3.
1, 202 N.L.R.B. 1137 (1973).
11 Id., 82 L.R.R.M. at 1768.
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after consultation with the other faculty members, that they were
considered to be faculty rather than administrators by the university,
and that their duties were essentially similar to those of other faculty
members." On the other hand, department chairmen were excluded
as supervisors in several cases where the Board credited such factors
as authority in the hiring or firing of faculty members, authority in
authorizing temporary leaves of absence by faculty, lack of teaching
duties, differential in pay scale, and direction and assignment of de-
partmental support personnel as determinative of the issue.47
The issue is not easily resolved. The Board's case-by-case ap-
proach is the one method of adjudication that will allow each institu-
tion to develop its own structure without necessarily putting the de-
partment chairmen in or out of a bargaining unit. The clearest guide-
lines in this regard are the specific criteria listed in Section 2(11) of
the Act. In a situation where collective bargaining is contemplated,
the duties given to department chairmen will be carefully watched by
both faculty members and administrators.
One criticism that can be properly directed at the NLRB is that,
rather than pointing to specific important factors that have caused
the Board to rule one way or the other on the status of department
chairmen, Board opinions reiterate every conceivable factor that
might tend to support its conclusion. Thus while the Board maintains
flexibility, future parties to NLRB proceedings are not given suffi-
cient standards by which their own affairs can be structured. 48
On the other hand, the status of department chairmen is proba-
bly the most unique unit determination problem. Absent agreement
of the parties, the question will invariably come up in Board election
cases. By maintaining an open-ended, case-by-case method with re-
gard to these employees, the Board can reach equitable results in
individual cases without having to strain around established rules.
3. Part-time Faculty
A second major area of concern in unit determinations is the
inclusion or exclusion of part-time faculty members. The Board's
original position was that such part-time employees should be in-
" See Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 81 L.R.R.M. 1345 (1972); Florida South-
ern College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888 (1972); University of Detroit, 193 N.L.R.B. 566 (1971); For-
dham Univ. 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 137-39 (1971).
"7 See Point Park College, 209 N.L.R.B. No. 152, 85 L.R.R.M. 1542 (1974); Fairleigh
Dickinson Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 84 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1973); Syracuse Univ., 204
N.L.R.B. No. 85, 83 L.R.R.M. 1373 (1973); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
s See Comment, The Bargaining Unit Status ofAcademic Department Chairmen, 40 U.
CHi. L. REV. 442 (1973).
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cluded under ordinary unit determination rules.49
In C. W. Post the Board focused on similarities in educational
background, teaching activities, and participation in faculty meetings
between adjunct and full-time faculty members. Under the ordinary
rules this was sufficient to include the adjunct faculty in the unit as
regular part-time employees."0 This inclusion of adjunct or part-time
faculty members was later refined with the adoption of the "4-to-l"
rule.-" This rule held that part-time faculty would be included if their
teaching duties were at least one-quarter of the normal full-time
teaching load. Then in 1973 the Board announced:
We are now convinced that the differences between the full-
time and part-time faculty are so substantial in most colleges and
universities that we should not adhere to the principle announced
in the New Haven case.52
The Board split 3-2 over the exclusion of part-time faculty with
the dissent focusing on the inflexibility of the Board's newly an-
nounced position, on the problems inherent in fragmenting labor
relations on the campus, and on the overriding similarities in the
functions performed by both groups, i.e. teaching."
In contrast to the situation with department chairmen, the issues
here are more clearly defined and in need of a less flexible rule. The
Board's decision to exclude part-time faculty from a unit of full-time
faculty is a sound one. Part-time teachers frequently have substantial
interests or careers outside the university that render their interests
at the bargaining table radically different than those of their full-time
colleagues. Also, because many part-time faculty members are only
present at the school for the duration of their classes, they do not
participate in some aspects of faculty employment which may be of
vital importance to full-time faculty members.
4. Professional Support Personnel
With regard to professional support personnel, such as librari-
ans, research associates, and counselors, the Board has generally
11 C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971); University of New Haven, Inc., 190
N.L.R.B. 478 (1971).
0 189 N.L.R.B. at 905-06. See, e.g., G. C. Murphy Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 370 (1968).
, University of Detroit, 193 N.L.R.B. 566 (1971).
'2 New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 83 L.R.R.M. 1549, 1552. In the New Haven
case the Board held that regular part-time faculty must be included in the same unit as full-
time faculty, absent agreement of the parties to exclude them. University of New Haven, Inc.,
190 N.L.R.B. 478 (1971).
0 205 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1555-58.
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included them in units of faculty members." In C. W. Post the Board
determined that the librarians were professional employees within the
Act who performed functions closely related to teaching and shared
many of the same benefits as the other unit employees.35 Essentially,
in making any unit determinations, the Board looks for a "com-
munity of interest" among the employees involved. If such a com-
munity of interest is found, the two groups of employees are pre-
sumed to be properly included in the same unit."
The rationale with regard to support personnel is that these
people are a closely allied professional group whose ultimate function
converges with that of the faculty. They perform services that are
essential in the educational process. Of course, to the extent that such
employees could be held not to be professionals within section 2(12)
of the Act (such as library workers with no special training who have
mechanical or clerical duties), they would be excluded from the fac-
ulty unit.
Arguments against inclusion of professional support staff gener-
ally emphasize that these employees are not included within the ten-
ure system and are therefore not involved in similar procedures for
appointment and promotion. Furthermore the working hours are
generally different, requiring different supervision. Support personnel
do not generally participate in the day-to-day affairs of academic
departments which are the basic units of faculty organization and
supervision, and they frequently are not involved in the traditional
university governance systems in which faculties have participated.
Finally, the historic academic freedoms have traditionally not been
" E.g., New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 16,83 L.R.R.M. 1549 (1973); Catholic Univ.,
201 N.L.R.B. 929 (1973); Florida Southern College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888 (1972); C.W. Post
Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
" 189 N.L.R.B. at 907. Section 2(12) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §152(12) (1970), defines
professional employee in the following manner:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii)
involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii)
of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from
an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual,
or physical processes. . ..
56 Note the special considerations that must be made when professional employees are
included in any unit. Section 9(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 159(b) quoted in note 35, supra. A
determination in the C. W. Post case that the librarians were professional employees obviated
a special vote otherwise required by §9(b).
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extended to support personnel.5 7 Despite these arguments, the NLRB
has opted for broader, more-inclusive units to avoid fragmenting
labor relations on the campus. As we shall see later, however, this
goal has been sacrificed in other circumstances.
Questions have also arisen concerning the supervisory status of
support personnel where their duties include hiring, firing, or direct-
ing nonunit employees. An example would be the trained librarian
who directs library workers whose duties are essentially clerical or
non-discretionary in nature, or a research associate who directs non-
professional employees engaged in a project. It had been previously
held that department chairmen, although playing a role in selecting
their secretaries and exercising some direction over them, were not
supervisors since they lacked authority directly to hire and to fire the
secretaries. 8 To further resolve such questions the Board adopted a
"fifty percent" rule whereby an employee whose principal duties were
of the same character as those of the other members of the unit would
not be excluded because of sporadic exercise of supervisory authority
over nonunit employees, as long as these supervisory duties consumed
less than fifty percent of the employee's working time. 9
This "fifty percent" rule will apply to all support personnel as
well as to department chairmen or regular faculty members. Thus, if
a librarian who would otherwise be included in the unit, spends fifty
percent or more of his or her time directing nonunit library workers,
he or she will be excluded from the unit. Likewise, if a faculty mem-
ber spends fifty percent or more of his or her time directing nonunit
laboratory workers, he or she will be excluded from the unit.
While the application of this rule seems to be simple enough,
there are definite difficulties in determining exactly what figure to use
for total working time. While support personnel, such as librarians,
usually have regular working hours, most faculty members do not
work a typical "9-to-5" schedule and individual "working time" may
vary greatly. In these circumstances, the adoption of a single figure
for the application of this rule may be inequitable if the unit includes
both faculty members and support personnel.
This is only symptomatic of the larger problems involved in the
Board's decision to include support personnel in units of faculty
members in the first instance. The disparity between these two groups
will be reflected at the bargaining table in the librarians' lack of
interest in teaching loads, class sizes, tenure, and other issues that
See generally, McHugh, Collective Bargaining with Professionals in Higher Education:
Problems in Unit Determinations, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 55.
58 Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971).
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may be at the heart of the faculty interest. By combining faculty
members with support personnel for bargaining purposes, the Board
may inadvertently water down these employees' rights by compro-
mising their ability to represent their individual interests. The inter-
ests of both groups will be best served by providing for separate units.
5. Personnel and Grievance Committee Members
Another significant question of supervisory status of faculty
members has been raised in connection with faculty members who
serve on personnel and grievance committees. In Adelphi
University,0 the Board decided to include such committee members
in the unit by a 2-1 decision, relying on C. W. Post. The distinction
between the two cases, which was forcefully argued in the dissent, was
that the Adelphi personnel committee consisted of eleven faculty
members, whereas in C. W. Post, an entire 600-member faculty
shared personnel authority. The function of the personnel committee
in Adelphi was to pass on all matters of tenure, hiring, promotions,
and granting of sabbatical leaves-of-absence. Although the board of
trustees held the final authority, the record showed that the commit-
tee's recommendations were almost always followed.6' The grievance
committee had three members who heard and made recommenda-
tions concerning the adjustment of all faculty grievances, except dis-
missal proceedings.12
The Board stated that the committees in this case, as in C. W.
Post, involved the concept of collegiality, wherein power and author-
ity is vested in a body composed of one's peers and colleagues, and
that this is not analogous to the traditional authority structures con-
templated by the Act and its concept of "supervisor."'" Conse-
quently, the Board concluded that the members of the committees did
not fit the traditional role of "supervisor" as that term is thought of
in the commercial world, and that these faculty members should not
be disenfranchised merely because they have some measure of quasi-
collegial authority either as an entire faculty or as representatives
elected by the faculty.
11 Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
o Id.
" Id. at 647-48.
SId.
The Board noted that the statutory concept of "supervisor" grows out of the fact-that
commercial organizations are pyramidal, with authority delegated from the top in bits and
pieces toward the bottom. In this instance the board of trustees (at the top of the pyramid) has
seen fit to seek, in a formalized manner, the advice of the faculty (the base of the pyramid)
through these committees. Id. at 648.
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6. Separate Units for Professional Schools
One glaring exception to the Board's general policy against frag-
menting labor relations has been in the area of professional schools,
notably law schools. In Fordham University64 the Board made an
early decision that a separate unit of law school faculty could be
appropriate for bargaining. The reasons cited by the Board for such
a conclusion included the separate location of the law building and
its lack of use by other units of the university, the lack of any inter-
change of faculty between the law school and other schools, the dif-
ferent tenure arrangement and salary structure, separate faculty com-
mittees, separate and external regulation of class hours by the state
courts and bar associations, the lack of departments within the
school, and the use of a different calendar.65
The Board has recently excluded the medical school from a
faculty representation election at the University of Miami on grounds
similar to those in the Fordham case.6 Also excluded at the Univer-
sity of Miami was the school of marine science. Thus, the trend seems
to be toward separate units where a sufficient amount of distinctness
or separation can be shown.Y7
While the Board has clearly indicated that an overall unit would
also be appropriate,68 one might question the advisability of allowing
separate units in professional schools or anywhere else. It is well
known that salary scales are not uniform among the many disciplines
at a university. Faculty members at professional schools such as law
and medicine have been paid at higher rates in order to effectively
compete with salaries available in private practice. One commentator
has suggested that bargaining be carried on through a "joint bargain-
ing committee" that would be formed through proportional represen-
tation:
" 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971).
I5 ld. at 136-37. In a footnote the Board stated:
Many of the factors set forth herein are equally applicable to the University's
other professional schools. As an overall unit including the faculty of professional
schools is appropriate, and as no party contends that the faculty of any professional
school other than the law school should constitute a separate unit, we need not pass
upon the appropriateness of any such separate unit.
Id. at 137 n. Il (emphasis added).
11 University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 87 L.R.R.M. 1634 (1974).
61 There may be a conflict between the Board's policy and that of other institutions
involved in this area. A recently promulgated American Bar Association rule requires ac-
credited law schools to be associated with a university, thus causing some previously indepen-
dent law schools to affiliate with universities.
1 See note 65, supra. See also Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 84
L.R.R.M. 1033 (1973) (election ordered in overall unit that included dental school); New York
Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 83 L.R.R.M. 1549 (1973) (law school unit).
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In the composition of a joint bargaining committee, faculty mem-
bers could be given the option of being represented either through
their departments or divisions or through independent constituen-
cies whenever a sufficient number choose to become a constituent
group for that purpose."
Such a committee, however, could be composed of a hundred or
more people at a large university, and the arrangement would appear
to be quite unwieldy. While this may avoid the undesirable result of
completely sacrificing the interests of a minority to the majority, the
added complexity hardly makes it worthwhile. Absent a workable
alternative, separate units, then, appear to be the best solution to the
problem.
Perhaps the real mistake that the NLRB has made was to
blindly apply the commercial, industrial rules of unit determination
to a completely different area of labor relations.70 If the Board has
truly entered into an "unchartered area,"7' old rules should not be
applied. The Board found this to be true with respect to part-time
faculty members, and in other areas, such as with support personnel,
more reversals may be expected.
In the area of separate units the Board has shown some innova-
tion by departing from its normal, industrial procedure for determin-
ing a separate unit. Rather than ordering the typical "Globe" elec-
tion72 to determine if the law school should have a separate unit, the
Board, in Syracuse University," ordered a self-determination elec-
tion whereby the law faculty could choose between inclusion in the
overall unit, separate representation, or separate nonrepresentation.
This procedure gave the law faculty a broader choice than the in-
dustrial procedure, and would allow the law faculty to vote to remain
" Sands, The Role of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 150,
169.
70 See text accompanying note 40 supra.
7' C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971).
" Globe Machine and Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937). In a typical "Globe" election
employees vote in two groups, with the minority group of skilled employees having the option
of voting for representation in a separate unit. If separate representation is not favored by the
majority in the skilled unit, then their votes are pooled with those of the other voting group to
determine the question of representation in the overall unit. Thus there could be four possible
results to such an election: (1) two separate bargaining agents, (2) a separate agent for the
skilled group but no agent for the others, (3) one overall agent, and (4) no agents. The Board's
ruling in Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 83 L.R.R.M. 1373 (1973), parallels the proce-
dure regularly followed as to professional employees pursuant to the statutory command of
Section 9(b)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1970), quoted note 35, supra. This procedure
also allows separate representation by the same agent for the two groups, or no agent for the
"professional" group (law faculty) but a separate agent for the others.
73 204 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 83 L.R.R.M. 1373 (1973)(two dissenters would have used the
traditional craft severance method).
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unrepresented while the remainder of the faculty voted for a bargain-
ing agent. This choice would be unavailable in a "Globe" election.
7. Other Unit Determinations
The Board has made other decisions in unit determinations con-
cerning the many and varied employees who might be included in a
faculty unit. The Board has generally allowed "terminal contract"
faculty to vote in representation elections. 74 These are faculty mem-
bers who have been hired on a year-to-year nontenured basis and have
been informed that their contracts will not be renewed. Universities
have frequently objected to their voting for obvious reasons. Deans,
on the other hand, have been generally excluded as supervisors, 75
although in some cases assistant deans have been included where they
have some teaching duties and their interests are more closely aligned
with those of the rest of the faculty. 76
The Board has gone both ways with regard to athletic coaches, 77
and has excluded ROTC professors who are officers in the armed
forces. 7 In an interesting reversal, the Board held that members of a
religious order would be excluded from a lay faculty bargaining unit.
The Board felt, essentially, that an oath of loyalty to a religious order
that also had a role in the administration of the university created an
overwhelming conflict of interest for these faculty members. More-
over, it was concluded that the economic interests of the two groups
did not coincide. The members of the religious order had taken a vow
of poverty and were dependent on the order itself for their needs. The
lay faculty, however, were dependent on their own earnings for their
support and that of their families.7 Graduate teaching assistants have
been excluded primarily on the ground that they are basically stu-
dents and do not share a sufficient community of interest with the
faculty members to warrant their inclusion in the unit."0
" E.g., New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 83 L.R.R.M. 1549 (1973); Tusculum
College, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 81 L.R.R.M. 1345 (1972).
73 E.g., Florida Southern College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888 (1972); C.W. Post Center, 189
N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
11 E.g., University of San Francisco, 207 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 84 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1973);
Catholic Univ., 201 N.L.R.B. 929 (1973).
7 E.g., Point Park College, 209 N.L.R.B. No. 152, 85 L.R.R.M. 1542 (1974) (excluded
from unit); Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65 (1972) (included).
11 E.g., Florida Southern College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888 (1972); Manhattan College, 195
N.L.R.B. 65 (1972).
"' Compare Seton Hill College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1973) (excluding members of religious
order and overruling prior determination) with Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971)
(members of religious order included).
U E.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
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As a final note in unit determinations, the question has arisen
whether a campus-wide or university-wide unit is proper where a
university has several campuses. The Board seems to be leaning in
the direction of a university-wide unit because of the similarities in
conditions at all campuses.8 1 Furthermore, most institutions generally
have a single, centralized administration which governs the entire
university. However, in one case, the Board rejected a university-wide
unit where considerable distance between the campuses was a signifi-
cant factor.82
B. Limitation of the Exercise of Jurisdiction to "Private" Colleges
and Universities.
When the Board assumed jurisdiction over colleges and universi-
ties in 1970, it made clear that this extension was limited to "private"
institutions. s3 Indeed, the LMRA limits the Board's statutory juris-
diction in the exclusion of "the United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, . . . or any State or political subdivision
thereof. . ." from the definition of "employer." 4 However, the ex-
tent of this exclusion is far from crystal clear.
In a 3-1 decision the Board declined jurisdiction over Temple
University.5 Temple received substantial assistance from the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania and was the subject of the Temple
University-Commonwealth Act of 1965.88 Under the provisions of
this statute Temple was established "as an instrumentality of the
Commonwealth to serve as a State-related institution in the Com-
monwealth system of higher education. 8 17 The statute provides for a
thirty-six member board of trustees of which twelve are named by the
Commonwealth. 8 The statute also has provisions concerning resident
and nonresident fee schedules, funds for capital improvements, and
appropriations from the state government. Thus, this act established
substantial ties between Temple and the state government.
The Board agreed nonetheless that Temple was an "employer"
within the meaning of the Act, but declined in its discretion to assert
jurisdiction. 9 The Board also presumed that the Temple employees
s1 See Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 205 N. .R.B. No. 101, 84 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1973).
82 Cornell Univ., 202 N.L.R.B. 290 (1973).
" Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
84 LMRA §2(2), 29 U.S.C. §152(2) (1970).
Temple Univ., 194 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1972).
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§2510-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
I7 d. §2510-2.
ss Id. §2510-4.
" 194 N.L.R.B. at 1161.
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would be covered by Pennsylvania's Public Employee Relations
Act." These two factors-substantial ties with the state and an ade-
quate and applicable state labor relations act-seemed to be at the
heart of the Board's decision. The result illustrates the NLRB's reluc-
tance to plunge into full jurisdiction over colleges and universities,
and it foreshadows, perhaps, a relinquishment of Board jurisdiction
to states willing to regulate this sector of employment.
The Board's decision in Temple University is a useful one if the
basic rationale is the availability and adequacy of a state labor rela-
tions statute. This is a legitimate use of federal power which will allow
states to take control of this sector of collective bargaining if they so
desire. Where a state does not have laws regulating labor-
management relations, however, the Board should assert its jurisdic-
tion to the full extent of its powers. The fact that a university in such
a state has substantial ties with that state should not be sufficient to
warrant discretionary denial of jurisdiction if the university is an
employer under the Act. Otherwise, the disparity of treatment from
one state to the next would be substantial.
Another significant decision came down when the Board dec-
lined jurisdiction over Howard University.' This also was a split
decision which the Board based on the "unique relationship" between
Howard and the federal government. Howard receives a substantial
amount of its revenues from Congress, is open to inspection by the
United States Office of Education, and has maintained a parity with
the federal government in pay scales and fringe benefits for nonaca-
demic employees.
The Howard decision goes beyond Temple in one very important
aspect-in Howard there was no applicable local law to which the
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§1101.101 et seq. (Supp. 1974). In a proviso to section 10(a) of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), the Board is given the power to relinquish jurisdiction to
state agencies. In such a case, however, the state law must be consistent with the LMRA:
[T]he Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory
to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining,
manufacturing, communications,'and transportation except where predominantly
local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting
commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the
determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding
provision of this Act or has received a construction inconsistent therewith.
LMRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
1, Howard Univ., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 86 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1974) (3-2 decision). In its
opinion the Board stated that, ". . . Howard enjoys a unique relationship with the Federal
Government unmatched by any other university to which our discretionary jurisdictional yards-
ticks apply." Id., 86 L.R.R.M. at 1391. See also Association of Hebrew Teachers, 210
N.L.R.B. No. 132, 86 L.R.R.M. 1249 (1974) (3-1 decision where the Board declined jurisdic-
tion over a nonprofit organization which operated after-school classes even though the Mid-
rasha College section offered regular undergraduate and graduate degrees).
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employees or employer could turn. Thus the Board denied to the
employees the rights guaranteed by the Act because of the benefits
given to them by the employer and the government. The Howard
decision illustrates the danger in the operation of discretionary juris-
diction. No one would suggest in the context of a purely private
industrial employer that the Board should not assert its jurisdiction
because the employees were well paid. Although Howard is a private
employer, its "unique relationship" with the federal government puts
its employees in a no-man's land of labor relations law.
With higher education relying increasingly on government subsi-
dies and grants, one might well wonder how long it will take before
the Board's jurisdiction is whittled away completely by such discre-
tionary decisions. If the Board's purpose is to put pressure on state
legislatures or if it is depending upon some kind of psychological
ripple-effect to bring uncovered employers into line, this should be
made known. The uncertainty produced by the Howard decision can
go a long way toward inhibiting development of sound labor relations
on the campus.
IV. SUBJECTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Under the Act, a collective bargaining agent is charged with
negotiating for "wages, hours . . ., or other conditions of employ-
ment" 2 on behalf of the unit employees. In a 1958 decision, the
Supreme Court established three categories of bargaining proposals
and established three sets of rules for them. 3 These are (1) illegal
subjects, (2) mandatory subjects, and (3) voluntary subjects. The first
category includes provisions that would be illegal under the LMRA,
the second includes the traditional "wages, hours, and other condi-
tions of employment," and the third includes any legal provisions
outside the second category.
While salaries and fringe benefits may be the first and primary
collective bargaining issue,94 one might expect that faculty representa-
tives may well be highly concerned about other issues such as educa-
tional policy and university government. In its broadest sense, the
phrase "terms and conditions of employment" includes many matters
outside of simply wages and hours. Faculty members are highly inter-
ested in areas such as subject matter assignments, tenure, and the
allocation of funds within and among departmental units. Further-
92 LMRA §9(a), 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1970).
NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
24 See the table compiled in Allen, Organizing the Eggheads: Professors and Collective
Bargaining, 23 LAB. L.J. 606, 612 (1972).
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more, faculty members might be expected to bargain about the selec-
tion of officers and trustees of the university or the process through
which institutional decisions are reached. In the industrial world these
have not been traditional areas for collective bargaining; in the educa-
tion sphere, however, we might expect that these subjects will be held
to be mandatory areas of bargaining. 5 There have been as yet no
Board decisions that might light the way. As a child of the '70's,
collective bargaining on the campus has hardly begun to crawl.
It has been further pointed out that while faculty participation
in university government is a tradition, the cyclical world of collective
bargaining, as it is known in industry, is ill-suited to the ongoing
needs of a university. 8 Rather than postponing problems that arise
during the term of a contract to an annual or biannual negotiating
session, significant problems on the campus should be given immedi-
ate attention. To attempt to use the industrial model may be to invite
disorder and chaos. Unless the whole inner structure of the academic
community is to be altered, the problem of university government
must be carefully surveyed before any attempt is made to transplant
industrial and commercial organs into the academic body.
Based on its performance so far, there is every reason to expect
that the NLRB will apply traditional rules to such issues as the scope
of mandatory bargaining and bargaining conduct until it is shown
that they are unworkable. In some cases this may be quite proper.
For example, in a recent case the Board ruled that a university must
provide a collective bargaining agent with budget information if the
administration uses financial problems as a justification for dismiss-
ing employees.9 7 This squares with established Board doctrine as ap-
plied to industrial employers,98 and the Board is on solid ground in
applying it to universities. The Board should not, however, allow such
an easy rule of applicability to lull it into thinking that collective
bargaining on the campus presents no new problems in this area.
In the area of unit determinations, for example, the individuals
and relationships involved, and the job classifications and duties are
so different from those in the factory that the Board would best fulfill
the policies of the Act by discarding all old rules in its determination
of an academic unit. Likewise, the scope of bargainable issues is an
area where the differences between the university and the factory may
translate into significantly different rules for collective bargaining.
, See Brown, Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1067 (1969).
" Sands, The Role of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 150,
153-59.
CHRONICLE HIGHER ED., May 20, 1974, at 4, col. 1.
" See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
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The history of labor relations between the parties, the structure
of university government and the expectations of the parties might
all be important factors in deciding what issues ought to be the sub-
ject of bargaining. For example, if a faculty union cannot insist on
an academic freedom clause in its contract, or agree with the univer-
sity that this will either fall within the jurisdiction of the university
government or otherwise be left outside the collective bargaining
talks, faculty members may be effectively discouraged from seeking
collective representation. The Board's initial position should be open-
ended and free from industry-oriented rules. The key here should be
to allow the parties to come to a mutual understanding on the
grounds for bargaining without sacrificing prior agreements.
The question of the scope of collective bargaining by faculties is
open to debate and to practical development.9 Board cases to date
have dealt primarily with questions of representation and proper bar-
gaining units. As these issues become settled, and as more bargaining
agents sit down with administrators to work out contracts, the Board
will be faced with more questions regarding the proper scope of bar-
gaining. This area promises to be one of rapid development in the
next few years.
V. THE FUTURE: CHANGING BOARD POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE
ACTION
Collective bargaining is clearly a reality on the campus today,"'0
and unless the Board's backstepping in Temple University and in
Howard University is evidence of a trend toward getting out of the
business, it can reasonably be expected that the Board will con-
sciously or unconsciously develop rules and patterns by which collec-
tive bargaining in colleges and universities can grow in an orderly and
peaceful manner. The Board's tendency to keep all options open and
to remain flexible will be a boon since all parties are feeling their way
in this "unchartered area." It has been fifteen years since Congress
has made any significant contribution to the NLRB's activities in
labor relations,0 ' and the Board's occasional reluctance to act could
be cured with proper direction from Congress.
One possible legislative solution is common labor-management
" Scholars and commentators have written extensively on this subject. See the excellent
bibliography published by the Manpower and Industrial Relations Institute at the University
of Alabama, J. NORTH, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1972).
"I See CHRONICLE HIGHER ED., June 10, 1974, at 24, col. I (reporting that 338 colleges
and universities have chosen collective bargaining agents).
101 The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 541 (1959).
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regulation for both public and private higher education. At present
the NLRB will take jurisdiction over most private institutions apply-
ing to it, leaving public institutions to the vicissitudes of state legisla-
tion. Common problems in both types of institutions militate toward
common regulation, especially as private institutions become more
dependent upon public monies. One bill now pending before Congress
would accomplish this by putting public employees under the jurisdic-
tion of the NLRB.102
The proposed solution would be to simply strike the words "or
any State or political subdivision thereof' from section 2(2) of the
Act. 03 This slight change would bring virtually all state employees
under the Act. While this may be a viable answer for faculty members
employed in public institutions, one might seriously question the wis-
dom of granting the right to strike, which is an integral part of the
LMRA,I°4 to police and fire department employees. Thus the objec-
tion to this legislative solution is not that it gives professors the right
to strike, but that it gives that right to all public employees without
discrimination.
This difficulty could be avoided by coupling the blanket inclu-
sion of public employees with special provisions and limitations
where necessary. This could provide a much more responsible solu-
tion to the question of public employee collective bargaining, but it
may overburden the already crowded docket of the NLRB. Further-
more, the newly added burden would not present familiar problems,
but would pose novel issues which would require additional consider-
ation.
A second solution is represented by the several proposed public
employee labor relations acts.0 5 Their difficulty vis-iz-vis higher edu-
cation is that public and private institutions would then be put under
separate sets of laws. Furthermore, at least with regard to the cited
bills, these proposals do not show a substantial recognition of the
unique problems of collective bargaining in academia. Thus, this
legislation, if enacted, would provide no further guide in such areas
as unit determination and the scope of bargainable issues than we
I" H.R. 9730, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
1' See note 6, supra, for the text of section 2(2).
MN LMRA §13, 29 U.S.C. §163 (1970), recognizes that the right to strike is inherent in
the Act:
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be con-
strued so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.
10 E.g., S.3295, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 8677 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). While
these statutes would apply to public educational institutions, jurisdiction over private colleges
and universities would be left to the NLRB.
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have already under the LMRA. If the Congress or a state legislature
is going to invest the time necessary to enact thoughtful statutes, it
should at least consider special provisions for collective bargaining in
higher education.
There are significant differences between public and private in-
stitutions which may warrant separate treatment under the law. For
example, in the public area the state government itself, through the
legislature, will most likely become the prime negotiator on the man-
agement side, rather than the particular university's administrators,
merely because of the legislature's control of the purse strings. At a
private institution the administrators and board of trustees directly
control the money. This would seem to militate toward a state-wide
bargaining unit for the public institutions rather than separate units
at each university.
On the other hand, these differences could be provided for by a
carefully drafted statute that would include both public and private
institutions, such as amendments to the LMRA. This would recog-
nize the distinctions, but would apply the more substantive parts of
the law, such as employer and employee rights, unfair labor practices,
and the right to strike, in an even-handed and uniform fashion. Ques-
tions on the supervisory status of certain employees and the scope of
bargainable issues will also be similar at both public and private
institutions. In short, the similarities in collective bargaining issues
at private and public colleges and universities outweigh the differ-
ences, and the most desirable statutory solution would embrace insti-
tutions in both sectors.
Another source of possible solutions lies in the area of state
legislation. Although only twenty-one states have adopted collective
bargaining procedures for faculty members in public institutions,'0"
more state laws seem certain to follow as the impact of NLRB juris-
diction spreads. Whereas federal legislation must necessarily be
broad if it is to apply on a national scale,0 7 states may, to a greater
degree, tailor their statutes to the needs of the parties involved.
The broader question of collective bargaining in higher educa-
tion is not limited to faculty members, but extends to middle manage-
ment professionals,'08 other support personnel, (to the extent that they
"' See CHRONICLE HIGHER ED., June 10, 1974, at 6, col. 1.
"0 For example, the LMRA has no special provisions for student involvement in collective
bargaining on the campus either as students or as employees. Thus the Board has excluded
students from a unit of clerical workers. Barnard College, 204 N.L.R.B. No. 155, 83 L.R.R.M.
1483 (1973).
,"' This category would include, for example, professional employees in the dormitories
and university business offices.
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are not identified as faculty members), nonacademic blue-collar
workers and students. In dealing with these groups in closer proxim-
ity, the state legislatures may be better informed than Congress on
the issues involved. The academic community, as well as the public,
would be best served by the enactment of specific legislation tailored
to its unique characteristics and needs." 9
Thus, a bill in the Virginia legislature,"' supported by the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors, makes provisions for sepa-
rate units for faculty members and for coexistence of faculty senates
and faculty bargaining representatives."' While the Virginia bill cov-
ers public employees in general, recognition of special problems in
academia is a step in the right direction. A specific statute aimed
solely at academic employees could provide for unit determinations,
scope of bargaining, prohibited practices, and the right to strike with-
out having to make qualification, limitations, and provisos for the
various other groups of public employees. Furthermore, such a state
statute could cover all institutions of higher education rather than
limit itself to public institutions."'
Although law-making on both the federal and state level is
fraught with special interest politics and other, perhaps unprincipled,
considerations, state legislatures generally have the further handicap
of fewer resources, smaller staffs, and less expertise than Congress.
The national need for effective state labor laws may bring such
groups as the American Law Institute, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the American Bar Asso-
ciation to the aid of the state law makers. With such assistance, state
legislation at least is a viable means for protecting the interests of
employees and employers in the academic world. At best, the state
legislators could set the pace in recognizing the special nature of labor
relations at our colleges and universities.
The problem is not irresolvable. The NLRB, despite its handicap
in operating under an industry-oriented statute, has played a signifi-
cant part in facing some initial questions. What is needed now is
thoughtful legislative response to the growing demand for collective
bargaining in higher education. Without such a response, knee-jerk
IN See Livingston & Christensen, State and Federal Regulation of Collective Negotiations
in Higher Education, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 91.
It0 H.B. 1808, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1973 Sess.
"' Id. at §§5(4)(c) & 6(4).
l While this would create concurrent jurisdiction with the NLRB, the Board could decline
jurisdiction, as it did in Temple, where the state statute adequately protects the parties involved.
See note 90, supra.
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reactions and short-term resolutions could pave the way toward a new
era of campus disorder.
Daniel R. Sharpe*
* Third year student, The Ohio State University College of Law. This paper was originally
written for Professor Claude Sowle's seminar on Law and Higher Education conducted during
Autumn quarter 1974 at the College of Law.
